We show that computing the most signicant bits of the secret key in a Die-Hellman keyexchange protocol from the public keys of the participants is as hard as computing the secret key itself. This is done by studying the following hidden number problem: Given an oracle O ; (x) that on input x computes the k most signicant bits of g x + mod p, nd ; mod p. We present many other applications of this problem including: (1) MSB's in El-Gamal encryptions, Shamir Message passing scheme etc. are hard to compute. (2) Factoring with hints. Our results lead us to suggest a new variant of Die-Hellman key exchange, for which we prove the most signicant bit is hard to compute.
Introduction

Motivation
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) relative to a base g in Z 3 p is to nd x given y = g x . Assuming this problem to be hard, Die and Hellman [DH76] proposed a public key system. Here two participants
Alice and Bob with private keys a and b respectively, compute g a and g b and send each other these values. Then they compute a secret key g ab . It is believed that computing the function DH g (g a ; g b ) = g ab is hard as DLP.
After the secret key agreement, Alice and Bob want to use a block-cipher for securing the session with encryption. For practicality and speed they may wish to use a block cipher. A natural way to derive the key for the cipher would be to use a block of bits from g ab . For example, if the length of the prime p has a length of 1024 bits, one may use the 64 most signicant bits of g ab . An attacker, who may not be able to compute the whole g ab , may nevertheless succeed in computing the part of the bits of g ab and crack the session. Hence it is important to know if the most signicant bits (MSB) of g ab are secure from an adversary who knows both g a and g b . Despite their long history, the security of the MSB's has not been shown for Die-Hellman keys.
A number of cryptographic schemes that have been proposed in the literature and used are related to or based on the Die-Hellman function DH g (g a ; g b ) = g ab . These schemes depend on the \hidden" In this paper, we study the security of the MSB's of Die-Hellman key exchange schemes and the related schemes mentioned above. Our results lead us to suggest a new variant of the Die-Hellman key exchange protocol.
Preliminaries and Statement of Results
Notation Throughout the paper we use the notation x mod p to denote the unique integer a in the range [0; p 0 1] satisfying x a (mod p).
Most Signicant bits We will often refer to the function MSB k (x) where 0 x < p. Given a prime p the function MSB k (x) is dened to be the integer t such that (t 0 1) 1 p=2 k x < t 1 p=2 k . For example, MSB 1 (x) is either 0 or 1 depending on whether x is smaller than or greater than p=2. For convenience we will sometimes assume that MSB k (x) is an integer z satisfying jx 0 zj < p=2 k+1 . The index of the (small) subinterval of [1,p-1] in which a number lies, is often used as the hard bits, e.g.
([BM],[LW]).
This notion of MSB k is very similar to the standard denition of the most signicant bit. These notions dier by at most 1 bit. That is, all our results will also work using the standard denition of the most signicant bit. Given the k most signicant bits of x we construct the number z as above by appending the appropriate number of zeros to the given bits. To address the questions at hand, we suggest studying the following problem:
Hidden Number Problem: Fix p and k. Let be O ;;g (x) be an oracle that on input x computes the k most signicant bits of g x + mod p. The task is to compute the hidden numbers and modulo p, given access to the oracle O ;;g (x).
One could query the oracle at chosen values for x and we assume that the oracle always gives the correct answer. (We briey discuss the case of oracles that sometimes give wrong answers later.) Note that the way the oracle is queried imposes a restriction. Namely, the multiplier for the hidden is an element of Z 3 p for which the querying party knows the discrete logarithm to the base g. Being able to deal with this restriction is quite crucial for the applications at hand. This makes the attack hard and diers from the methods used when this restriction is relaxed, which we describe next. MSB's of the sequence, improving on their p= log log p bits bound.
Main Results
We rst prove the following two results regarding the hardness of MSB's of Die-Hellman keys. We remark here that to elude attacks like those in [B 95] resulting from lost session keys in a multi-party scenario, it is suggested for next round of standards that the secret key be hashed with a collision-resistant hash function (e.g. MD5, SHA) to break the algebraic correlations. Extracting hard-core bits uses much weaker hash functions (like inner product mod 2, or ax + b mod p), and the hash value this can be used as a key for a (pseudo) random function to derive keys that are provably uncorrelated session keys for dierent sessions.
Proofs of the main results
In this section we describe two algorithms for the hidden number problem. For notational convenience we assume that the prime p and the generator g of Z 3 p are xed. Throughout this section we let n = log p.
2.1
Using Square Root logp Bits
The main theorem of this section shows that the hidden number problem can solved using an oracle which output p log p bits. An important result due to Babai [4] shows how given a lattice L and a point v one can nd a lattice point which is approximately the closest to v. Using the lattice basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovasz [13] he proves the following. We discuss the issue of predicting truncated Random Number Sequences in the nal version.
A nonuniform result
We show that there exist a polynomial number of advice bits which depend only on p which enable one to solve the hidden number problem in polynomial time using an oracle which returns only log log p bits.
THEOREM 2.4 Let p be a prime and g a generator of Z 3 p . Set m = dlog log pe. For a hidden dene the function O(r) = MSB m ( 1 g r mod p). Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm which takes a polynomial number of advice bits depending only on p and recovers given an oracle for the function O.
The proof relies on a new lattice rounding technique to solve the hidden number problem. We intend to query the oracle O at uniformly and independently chosen inputs r 1 ; : : : ; r d . The value of d will be specied later. Set t i = g ri mod p then the oracle O will output integers a 1 ; : : : ; a d ; a d+1 such that j(t i mod p) 0 a r j < R and j( mod p) 0 a d+1 j < R To keep the discussion general we do not specify the value of R for now. Note that a d+1 is found by querying the oracle at r = 0. Our goal is to recover from this information.
The algorithm we propose works as follows: rst we form the lattice L used in Section 2. We prove that with high probability (over the choice of the random t i ) the lattice L 3 has a basis with low L 1;1 norm. Then with probability 1=2 there exists a basis of this lattice with L 1;1 < 3 log 2 p=p.
The proof relies on the following lemma. Chebyshev's inequality now gives:
Hence, Z 1 with probability at least 1 0 1 2 m03 . When Z 1 there exists at least one set S k satisfying the required condition. Therefore, the required S k exists with probability at least 1 0 1 2 m03 . We conclude that the probability that The proof of Theorem 2.4 follows from Theorem 2.6. The advice bits used by the rounding algorithm will be a set of integers t 1 ; : : : ; t d along with a basis of L 3 satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2.6. The theorem shows that indeed there exist integers t 1 ; : : : ; t d for which the required basis exists 1 . Since the L 1;1 norm of such a basis is less than (log log p)=p, Lemma 2.5 shows that for the rounding algorithm to nd the correct it suces that the oracle return only log logp bits. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.4.
3
We note that constructing a basis satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2.6 is likely to be hard. It requires one to solve certain instances of the modular subset sum problem. Impagliazzo and Naor [11] noted that these instanced are likely to be hard.
2.4
The case of a small generator
In the previous section we proved that a hidden number can be recovered using an oracle that output 3 p log p bits. We now take these lower and upper bounds to be L and U to be used at the next iteration. Observe
. This shows that the gap between U and L decreased as expected completing the proof of the theorem.
3
In the case when g = 2 the function SB g (x) is simply the MSB 1 (x) function used in Section 2.
Hence, in this case the theorem proves that the most signicant bit is sucient for recovering the hidden number .
1 Theorem 2.6 shows even more; it shows that for most tuples (t1; : : : ; td ) such a basis is known to exist. This is a special case of the Die-Hellman function which could potentially be easier to break. The standard heuristic way of arguing about the security of the Die-Hellman protocol is to argue that the corresponding discrete log problem is hard. In our case the corresponding discrete log problem is that of computing discrete log of 2 base g. One can easily show that computing discrete log of 2 base g is as hard as computing discrete log of any x base g. Thus, at least the standard heuristic discrete log argument supports the security of this variant.
A more general rounding technique
Theorem 2.8 is very useful when the generator g is small. Unfortunately the proof does not seem to generalize to the case of arbitrary generator. In this section we give a more powerful proof of a theorem slightly weaker than Theorem 2. corresponds to an oracle which returns more than log 3dg of the most signicant bits of g k . Since log 3dg log g + log log p + 2 we see that the hidden number problem can be solved using this many bits. For small g this is not as strong as Theorem 2.8. However, the above algorithm uses the general MSB oracle rather than the special SB oracle used in the algorithm of Theorem 2.8.
We are hopeful that the above proof can be generalized to show that a small number of bits suces to solve the hidden number problem for an arbitrary generator g. To do so one must construct a basis of L 3 with low L 1;1 norm for a general g.
